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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
____________ 
 
No. 14-1661 
____________ 
 
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 
 
v. 
 
TYREEK STYLES, 
                 Appellant 
____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court  
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania 
 (E.D. Pa. 2-10-cr-00770-015) 
District Judge:  Honorable Michael M. Baylson 
____________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
September 8, 2014 
 
Before:  FISHER, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed:  October 8, 2014 ) 
____________ 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
____________ 
 
FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
 Appellant Tyreek Styles appeals his conviction and sentence for aiding and 
abetting the attempted possession with the intent to distribute cocaine.  Styles challenges 
the district court’s denial of his motions for acquittal and a new trial, the district court’s 
  
2 
decision not to read or play back certain testimony for the jury during deliberations, and 
the reasonableness of his sentence.  We will affirm.
1
 
I. 
 We write principally for the parties, who are familiar with the factual context and 
legal history of this case.  Therefore, we will set forth only those facts that are necessary 
to our analysis. 
 In 2009, a multistate task force began investigating a suspected drug trafficking 
organization in Philadelphia headed by Bellvin Smith.  The task force suspected that 
Smith and others traveled to Las Vegas and Los Angeles to purchase powder cocaine, 
crack cocaine, and marijuana and transported the drugs to the Philadelphia area for sale. 
 On July 25, 2012, a grand jury in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania indicted 
Styles and ten others for crimes related to the drug trafficking scheme.  The grand jury 
charged Styles with one count of conspiracy to distribute five kilograms or more of 
cocaine, 280 grams or more of crack cocaine base, and marijuana, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), and (b)(1)(D) and 846, and one count of attempted 
possession with the intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, in violation of 21 
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(B) and 846, and 18 U.S.C. § 2. 
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 Styles’s codefendant, Zachary Chambers, has also appealed his conviction and 
sentence.  See Docket No. 13-3518.  We address his appeal with a separate opinion and 
judgment. 
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 At trial, Bellvin Smith testified about his relationship with Styles.  Smith testified 
that Styles knew Smith sold narcotics; that Styles exchanged small bills for large bills to 
help Smith transport cash more easily; that Styles had driven Smith to Los Angeles twice, 
knowing that Smith intended to buy narcotics there; and that Styles had brought between 
$15,000 and $20,000 to the Philadelphia airport on one occasion, intending to bring the 
money to Las Vegas and knowing that Smith would use it to buy drugs, although the trip 
was cancelled. 
 The jury found Styles not guilty of the conspiracy charge but found him guilty of 
the attempted possession charge.  Styles filed a motion for acquittal and a motion for a 
new trial, both of which the district court denied.  The district court sentenced Styles to 
72 months of incarceration, three years of supervised release, and a $3,000 fine.  Styles 
filed a timely notice of appeal. 
II. 
 The district court had jurisdiction over this criminal action under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 3231.  We exercise jurisdiction to review the district court’s judgment of conviction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and to review the sentence imposed under 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). 
III. 
A. 
Styles contends that no reasonable jury could convict him of attempted possession 
with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of cocaine, so the district court should have 
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granted his motion for acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29.  
Alternatively, he argues that the verdict went against the weight of the evidence, so the 
district court should have granted his motion for a new trial under Rule 33. 
We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 29 motion for acquittal de novo 
“and independently apply the same standard the district court uses in deciding the 
motion.”  United States v. Caraballo-Rodriguez, 726 F.3d 418, 424 (3d Cir. 2013) (en 
banc).  The Court reviews the evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to the 
Government to determine whether any reasonable trier of fact could find each essential 
element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 
(1979).  We review a district court’s decision on a Rule 33 motion for a new trial for 
abuse of discretion.  See United States v. Jasin, 280 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2002).  A new 
trial is warranted if the jury’s verdict is contrary to the weight of the evidence and if 
“there is a serious danger that a miscarriage of justice has occurred—that is, that an 
innocent person has been convicted.”  United States v. Johnson, 302 F.3d 139, 150 (3d 
Cir. 2002) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
The grand jury charged Styles with violating 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1) and 846 and 
18 U.S.C. § 2.  Section 2 provides, “Whoever commits an offense against the United 
States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces or procures its commission, is 
punishable as a principal.”  18 U.S.C. § 2(a).  In other words, a person who aids and abets 
a violation of federal law is punished as though he committed the violation himself.  To 
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convict Styles of aiding and abetting the attempted possession with intent to distribute 
500 grams or more of cocaine, the Government needed to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that (1) someone attempted to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with the intent 
to distribute it; (2) Styles knew about the commission of the offense; and (3) Styles acted 
with the specific intent to facilitate the offense.  See United States v. Petersen, 622 F.3d 
196, 208 (3d Cir. 2010). 
Based on Bellvin Smith’s testimony, a reasonable trier of fact could find beyond a 
reasonable doubt that (1) Smith attempted to possess 500 grams or more of cocaine with 
the intent to distribute it; (2) Styles knew Smith was trying to possess 500 grams or more 
of cocaine with the intent to distribute it; and (3) Styles exchanged smaller bills for larger 
bills, carried cash on his person, drove Smith to Los Angeles, and performed other 
actions with the specific intent of helping Smith possess 500 grams or more of cocaine to 
distribute it in Philadelphia. 
Accordingly, we find there was sufficient evidence for the jury to convict Styles of 
aiding and abetting the attempted possession with the intent to distribute 500 grams or 
more of cocaine.  We also find that the verdict was not against the weight of the evidence 
and that no miscarriage of justice has occurred.  Therefore, the district court did not err in 
denying the Rule 29 and Rule 33 motions. 
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B. 
Styles argues that the district court should have granted the jury’s request to read 
back a portion of Smith’s testimony during their deliberations.  Styles asks us to review 
this claim for plain error, our standard of review when a defendant has not objected to the 
district court’s decision.  Fed. R. Crim. P. 52(b).  But when a defendant “affirmatively 
state[s] that [he is] satisfied” with the district court’s decision, he may not subsequently 
challenge the decision on appeal.  Gov’t of V.I. v. Bradshaw, 569 F.2d 777, 781 (3d Cir. 
1978); see also United States v. Maury, 695 F.3d 227, 256-57 (3d Cir. 2012) (if a 
defendant requests a particular jury instruction and the district court adopts it, the 
defendant waives appeal on that issue unless a change in law has occurred). 
During deliberations, the jury asked that testimony of three witnesses concerning a 
certain day be read back to them.  The district court suggested that pulling out the three 
witnesses’ requested testimony from the hours of recordings would be time-consuming.  
The Government agreed and proposed instructing the jury to rely on their memories of 
the testimony.  Defense counsel stated at that time, “I agree, Your Honor.”  J.A. 102.  
Accordingly, the court instructed the jury to rely on their memories of the witnesses’ 
testimony. 
Because Styles, through counsel, affirmatively expressed agreement with the 
district court’s response to the jury’s request, he has waived any challenge to the district 
court’s decision, and we will not review this issue. 
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C. 
Finally, Styles argues that his sentence is substantively unreasonable because the 
district court should have given him a two-level reduction in his advisory Guidelines 
offense level under U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2(b) as a minor participant in the offense, because the 
Sentencing Commission has proposed a two-level offense-level reduction for all drug 
quantities listed in the Table in § 2D1.1, and because he is susceptible to abuse in prison 
as a former correctional officer.  We review the substantive reasonableness of a sentence 
for abuse of discretion.  United States v. Lopez-Reyes, 589 F.3d 667, 670 (3d Cir. 2009). 
The district court considered these arguments at Styles’s sentencing and did not 
abuse its discretion.  The district court reasonably determined Styles was not a minor 
participant in the offense.  The district court did not err in denying Styles an offense-level 
reduction based on a proposed Guidelines amendment that Congress may yet reject and 
that he may be able to secure through a post-conviction motion.  And the district court 
did not unreasonably weigh the significance of Styles’s employment as a prison guard in 
determining an appropriate sentence, particularly in light of the below-Guidelines 
sentence Styles actually received.  Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion 
in imposing a sentence of 72 months of incarceration. 
IV. 
For the reasons above, we will affirm Styles’s conviction and sentence. 
